Abstract
Statistic analysis is a widely used computation in real life, but the known methods usually require one to know the whole data set; little work has been conducted to investigate how statistical analysis could be performed in a cooperative environment, where the participants want to conduct statistical analysis on the joint data set, but each participant is concerned about the confidentiality of its own data. In this paper we have developed protocols for conducting the statistic analysis in such kind of cooperative environment based on a data perturbation technique and cryptography primitives,

Introduction
The growth of the Internet opens up tremendous opportunities for cooperative computation, where the answer depends on the private inputs of separate entities. Sometimes these computations may occur between mutually untrusting entities. The problem is trivial if the context allows the conduct of these computations by a trusted entity that would know the inputs from all the participants; however if the context disallows this then the techniques of secure multiparty computation become very relevant and can provide useful solutions.
In this paper we investigate how various statistical analysis problems could be solved in a cooperative environment, where two parties need to conduct statistical analysis on the joint data set. We call the new problems secure two-party statistical analysis problems.
Basic statistic analysis operations consist of computing the mean value of a data set, the standard deviation, the correlation coefficient between two different features, the regression line and so on. If one knows the full data set, one can use the standard equations described in most of the fundamental statistics books to conduct the analysis. However, in the cooperative environment, one might need to conduct statistical analysis without being able to know the full data set because of the privacy constraints. The following examples illustrate this kind of situation:
A school wants to investigate the relationship between people's intelligence quotient (IQ) scores and their annual salaries. The school has its students' IQ scores, but does not have students' salary information; therefore the school needs to cooperate with companies that hire the students, but those companies are not willing to disclose the salary information. On the other hand, the school cannot give students' IQ scores to their employers either.
Two retail companies and each have a data set about their own customers' buying behaviors. Both companies want to conduct statistical analysis on their joint data set for mutual benefit. Since these two companies are competitors in the market, they do not want to disclose the detailed customers' information to the other company, but they feel comfortable disclosing only the aggregate information.
The standard statistical analysis methods cannot easily extend to solve the above problems; we need methods that support statistical analysis in a privacy-preserving manner. The goal of this paper is to develop protocols for this type of cooperative statistical analysis.
There are two common ways of cooperation in practice. For example, suppose and are two different features of a sample, and they are both used for a statistical analysis. In a cooperative environment, sometimes both cooperating parties can observe both and features of the sample, while at some other time, one party can only observe feature of the sample, and the other party can only observe feature of the same sample. The difficulties of cooperation in these situations are different. Therefore, based on whether the two cooperating parties could observe the same features of a sample or not, we formalized two different models for the secure two-party statistical analysis: the heterogeneous model and the homogeneous model. As we will show later, the solutions to these two different models are very different.
To conduct the statistical analysis in a cooperative environment, data exchange between the two parties is needed. However, to preserve the privacy of the data, no party should send its data to the other party in plain. In our solution, we use a data perturbation technique, namely we add random numbers to the original data to disguise the original data. Conducting statistical analysis based on the perturbed data surely produces a perturbed and therefore wrong result.
In this paper we have demonstrated various ways to remove, without compromising the privacy, the perturbation from the result to produce a correct result. Our techniques are based on several cryptography primitives, such as 1-out-ofn Oblivious Transfer protocol and homomorphic encryption schemes.
Most of the statistical analysis computation investigated in this paper involve scalar product of two private vectors, each of which comes from a different party; therefore, we have studied the private scalar product problem independently, and use the solution to build the protocols for the statistical analysis problem. In addition to being used in this paper, the private scalar product protocol could also be used to solve many other secure two-party problems, such as secure two-party computational geometry problems discussed in [9] . We will discuss the private scalar product problem independently in the paper.
In this preliminary study, we assume that all parties are semi-honest; informally speaking, a semi-honest party is one who follows the protocol properly with the exception that it keeps a record of all its intermediate computations and might try to derive other parties' private inputs from the record. This semi-honest model is one of the widely adopted models in the studies of general secure multi-party computation problem.
Section 2 describes related work and some cryptography primitives will be used in this paper. Section 3 presents an important building block, the scalar product protocol, which will be used later to solve secure two-party statistical analysis problems. Section 4 presents the definitions of secure two-party statistical analysis problems and their solutions. Finally section 5 concludes this paper and proposes several future research directions.
Related Work Secure Multi-Party Computation
The secure two-party statistical analysis problems described in the previous section are actually special cases of the general Secure Multi-party Computation problem [13, 6, 3] . Generally speaking, a secure multi-party computation problem deals with computing a function on any input, in a distributed network where each participant holds one of the inputs, ensuring that no more information is revealed to a participant in the computation than can be computed from that participant's input and output. The history of the multi-party computation problem is extensive since it was introduced by Yao [13] and extended by Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson [6] , and by many others.
In theory, the general secure multi-party computation problem is solvable using circuit evaluation protocol [13, 6, 3] . In the circuit evaluation protocol, each functionality is represented as a Boolean circuit, and then the parties run a protocol for every gate in the circuit. While this approach is appealing in its generality, the communication complexity of the protocol it generates depends on the size of the circuit that expresses the functionality to be computed, and in addition, involves large constant factors in their complexity. Therefore, as Goldreich points out in [3] , using the solutions derived by these general results for special cases of multi-party computation can be impractical; special solutions should be developed for special cases for efficiency reasons. This is our motivation of seeking special solutions to statistical analysis problems, solutions that are more efficient than the general theoretical solutions.
½-out-of-AE Oblivious Transfer
Goldreich's circuit evaluation protocol uses the ½-out-of-AE Oblivious Transfer, and our protocols in this paper also heavily depends on this protocol. An ½-out-of-AE Oblivious Transfer protocol [4, 2] 
Homomorphic Encryption Schemes
We need a public-key cryptosystems with a homomorphic property for some of our protocols:
´Üµ £ ´Ýµ ´Ü · Ýµ. Many such systems exist, and examples include the systems by Benaloh [1] , Naccache and Stern [7] , Okamoto and Uchiyama [11] , Paillier [12] , to mention a few. A useful property of homomorphic encryption schemes is that an "addition" operation can be conducted based on the encrypted data without decrypting them.
New Building Blocks
In this section, we introduce a secure two-party protocols: the scalar product protocol. This protocol serves as an important building block in solving the secure two-party statistical analysis problems considered later in the paper. This protocol is first presented in [9] . We have developed two protocols, and we will present both of them here. 
Scalar Product Protocol
How is privacy achieved:
If Bob chooses to guess, his chance of guessing the correct is 1 out of Ô Ñ . The purpose of Ö is to add randomness to Î ¡ , thus preventing Alice from deriving information about .
The communication complexity of the above protocols is Ç´ÑÔµ. We can improve it to Ç´Ñ · Ôµ by using the following scheme: Alice sends Î ½ Î Ñ and À ½ À Ô altogether to Bob then doing Ñ-out-of-´Ñ · Ôµ oblivious transfer. The probability of Bob guessing correct is now 1 out ´Ñ Ñ · Ôµ, which could be small enough if we choose an appropriate value for Ô.
Scalar Product Protocol 2
Our next solution does not rely on 1-out-of-n Oblivious Transfer cryptography primitive as the previous one does, but is instead based on a homomorphic public key system. In the following discussion, we define ´ µ as another vector whose elements are random permutation of those of vector .
We begin with two observations. First, a property of the scalar product ¡ is that ´ µ¡ ´ µ ¡ , regardless of what is. Secondly, if Bob sends a vector ´Î µ to Alice, where and Î are known only to Bob, Alice's chance of guessing the position of any single element of the vector Î is ½ out of Ò (Ò is the size of the vector); Alice's chance of guessing the positions of all of the elements of the vector Î is ½ out of Ò .
A naive solution would be to let Alice get both ´ µ and ´ µ but not . Let us ignore for the time being the drawback that Alice gets the items of in permuted order, and let us worry about not revealing to Alice: Letting Alice know ´ µ allows her to easily figure out the permutation function from knowing both and ´ µ. In order to avoid this problem, we want to let Alice know only ´ · Ê µ instead of ´ µ, where Ê is a random vector known only to Bob. Because of the randomness of · Ê , to guess the correct , Alice's chance is only ½ out of Ò . 1. Alice generates a key pair for a homomorphic public key system and sends the public key to Bob. The corresponding encryption and decryption is denoted as ´¡µ and ´¡µ. Based on Secure Two-Party Permutation Protocol, we have developed the following scalar product protocol:
Protocol 3. (Secure Two-Party Scalar Product Protocol 2)
Inputs: Alice has a secret vector , Bob has a secret vector .
Output: Alice gets ¡ ·Ú where Ú is a random scalar known to Bob only. 
How is privacy achieved:
The purpose of Ê is to prevent Alice from learning . The purpose of is to prevent Alice from learning Î . Although Alice learns a random permutation of the Î , she does not learn more because of the randomness of Î . Without , Alice could learn each single value of Î .
If Alice chooses to guess, in order to successfully guess all of the elements in , her chance is´½ Ò µ Ñ .
Alice's chance of successfully guessing just one elements of is 1 out of Ò Ñ . For example, in order to guess the th element of , Alice has to guess the the corresponding elements in ´Î µ for all ½ Ñ . Because for each single , the possibility is 1 out of Ò, the total possibility is 1 out of Ò Ñ .
A drawback of this protocol is that the information about È Ò ½ Ý is disclosed because the random permutation does not help to hide this information.
Implementation Issues
During the implementation, we need to consider the padding issues because most of the encryption scheme require padding if the size of a number is smaller than the expected size. For the security reason, A fixed padding cannot be used because it makes brute force attack possible. However, if random padding is used, how could Alice in 
Complexity Analysis
In the following discussion, we assume that is the number of bits needed to represent any number in the inputs, Although the value of depends on the specific implementation of the protocol, it is reasonable to assume ; therefore the communication cost becomes Ò £ ¿ , which is significantly more expensive than our scalar product protocols.
Secure Two-Party Statistical Analysis Problems and Protocols
Statistical Analysis Background
Without loss of generality, throughout this paper, we will use a data set of size Ò that only consists of two different features Ü and Ý, where
As a preliminary study on the topic of secure two-party statistical analysis, we only focus on several basic statistical analysis, which are reviewed in the the following: 
Two Models of Cooperation
There are many ways two parties could cooperate in performing statistical analysis; Figure 2 describes two ways of cooperation that are common in practice. The first one is the heterogeneous cooperation model (Figure 2.b) . In this model, each party holds different features of a data set. For example, if the whole data set consists of employees' salaries and ages, in a heterogeneous model, Alice could hold the salary information while Bob holds the age information.
The second way of cooperation is the homogeneous cooperation model (Figure 2 .c). In this model, both party hold the same features, but each party holds a different subset of the data set. For instance, in a homogeneous model, Alice could hold department A's employee information while Bob holds department B's employee information.
Both of the above cooperation models are quite common in practice. In this paper, we have formally defined secure two-party statistical analysis problems corresponding to these cooperation models, and have developed protocols for those problems. analysis problem, could be solved in a way more efficient than the general circuit evaluation approach. Apart from those basic statistical analysis computations studied in this paper, many other types of statistical analysis are also used in practice. A future direction would be to study more complicated statistical analysis computations, such as nonlinear regression, variance analysis and so on. Furthermore, we could also study, under the same secure two-party context, various data analysis computations other than the statistical analysis. Data mining is a very interesting and more complicated data analysis computation that is worth of study.
Heterogeneous Model
